

COUNTRIES

YEMEN
GENERAL
8/61-9/62

REFERENCE BOX 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

39

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 19893

Rec'd: August 26, 1961

5:17 p.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 91, August 26, 8 a.m.

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EUR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 91, INFORMATION JIDDA 20

E

BCEA

Italian Minister Guillet informs Legation:

BFAC

ICA

P

1. GOY and USSR have initialed draft agreement for construction Hodeida-Taiz asphalted road on basis soft, payment-deferred loan. Draft sent Moscow for final review. Guillet comments US could still pre-empt project by offer construct road on grant basis.

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

2. Hodeida Port Management Agreement concluded under which Russians will supply 75 technicians for 2-year period.

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

3. USSR has offered GOY 40 scholarships for training Yemeni students in all phases petroleum engineering.

RMR

Comment: Russians vigorously pursuing objective placing strangle-hold on Yemen economy which neither present nor any future regime can readily break, and which they can use as powerful lever on Yemeni policy.

Implementation Hodeida-Taiz road project will establish Soviets in force in southern provinces where their presence heretofore thin. Their ability (proved at Hodeida Port) to move promptly and effectively will provide them opportunity further discredit in Yemeni eyes US road project which still bogged down in administrative complexity, transport difficulties and ill luck, and handicapped by political restrictions imposed by GOY (such as use Mocha rather than Adenas entry port and prohibition air survey). We thus face possible serious damage US prestige.

More important

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 91, August 26, 8 a.m. from Taiz

More important, at stake is whether we shall demonstrate to Yemenis that free society able make rapid and efficient contribution to progress their undeveloped country. This will be important factor in direction inevitable social change will take in Yemen.

Legation urges Washington agencies concerned make serious concerted effort devise means accelerate construction Mocha-Taiz-Sanaa road, as well as advance date initiation construction Taiz water system, which we disturbed learn now deferred to June 1962.

Charge intends inform Abu Talib we interpret Russian offer oil scholarships as effort eventually sabotage MECOM operation and extend control over Yemen petroleum industry if oil found. Will point out such training can be obtained under scholarship program offered by MECOM (five students every six months) or under ICA participants program in Lebanon, without resort to USSR.

STOOKEY

HC/14

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ITEM: 2

DATE: 8/29/61

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 99 (TAIZ)

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
 COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

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ITEM: 3

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 EMBTel 100 (TAIZ)

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

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ITEM: 4

DATE: 9/12/61

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 113 (TAIZ)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

5

30-32

~~SECRET~~Action
NEA

Control: 9700

Rec'd: OCTOBER 16, 1961
2:38 PMInfo
SS
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SP
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P
USIA
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

FROM: TAIZ

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 165, OCTOBER 15, 1 PM

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 165, ROME NIACT 5, INFORMATION JIDDA 48

FALSE REPORT IMAM AHMADS ABDICATION DUE MISINTERPRETATION HIS
ACCESSION DAY BROADCAST CONFIRMING EXISTING DELEGATION POWERS TO
CROWN PRINCE. VOA CARRIED CORRECT STORY 14TH.

STOOKEY

RMR

MEM

NOTE: MR. KILGORE'S OFFICE (NE) NOTIFIED 10/16/61. CWO-M

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7
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



10/18
Home (y turn for this) 698
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

10/19 - Orig O'Daniel 10/19
Mr. Bundy appears
October 17, 1961
(See note in
red ink).

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNNY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposal that President Receive
The Crown Prince of Yemen in the
Course of Latter's Unofficial
Visit to the United States

We have learned that the Crown Prince of Yemen, Prince Saif al-Islam Mohammed Al-Badr, is interested in making a private visit to the United States late in October. Prince Badr, who is heir-designate to the Imam of Yemen and the country's Foreign Minister, is extremely impressionable. Following the red-carpet treatment accorded him last year in the Soviet Union and Communist China, the Crown Prince returned to Yemen with a pronounced pro-Soviet Bloc bias. In the last six months, however, he has evidenced a desire to maintain friendly contact with Western officials in Yemen, and the time appears to be propitious for him to visit this country.

The importance of assuring that the Crown Prince obtains a favorable impression of this country is indicated by the fact that in recent years the possibility of Soviet Bloc domination of Yemen has become a real one. Seeking foreign help to assist in its modernization, Yemen has accepted substantial Sino-Soviet Bloc military and economic aid with the result that the Bloc presence is the predominant foreign one in Yemen today. Under these circumstances the United States has had to address itself to the problem of how to prevent the growth of the Bloc position to a point where it could serve tangible strategic purposes or where it might facilitate the creation of a Communist-dominated government.

Arriving on the scene after the USSR and Communist China, the United States has moved in the last three years through diplomatic and economic channels to establish a modest presence in Yemen. We have sought to counter the Sino-Soviet influence by a number of steps, including opening a diplomatic mission in Yemen, providing surplus wheat and flour to meet acute drought-induced shortages, constructing a key 250-mile road from the coast to the interior, and installing a municipal water system in Taiz.

CONFIDENTIAL

6

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

While Crown Prince Badr is a weak individual who may well lack the capacity to retain the throne once he succeeds to it--particularly in view of the presence of forces in Yemen which may actively oppose his succession upon the death of the Imam, it would be unwise for us to assume the early demise of the Imam or the early eclipse of the Crown Prince. As recently as October 12 in a speech which was at first misinterpreted to denote his abdication, the Imam reaffirmed his wish to have Badr succeed him. Our current posture is to maintain the best possible relations with Prince Badr and to avoid creating the impression that we oppose him because of his past pro-Soviet proclivities.

We believe that if the President were to receive Crown Prince Badr should the latter visit this country, United States interests in Yemen would be enhanced. An advance indication to the Crown Prince that the President is prepared to receive him would be in our interests even if he should choose not to come. Accordingly, we propose sending the enclosed telegram to our Ambassador in Rome, where the Prince is now staying, indicating that the President would be happy to receive the Crown Prince should he be in Washington, D. C. in the course of his proposed private visit to the United States. I also enclose a copy of Embassy Rome's telegram reporting the Yemeni approach on this matter.

/s/ William H. D. Battle

L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Proposed Telegram to American Embassy, Rome.
2. Rome's Telegram 1217, October 9.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DRAFT TELEGRAM~~

ACTION: AmEmbassy ROME

INFO: AmLegation TAIK
AmEmbassy JIBBA
AmEmbassy LONDON

Rome's 1217.

While visit Crown Prince Badr to US would probably enhance US-Jemen relations, President's crowded schedule prevents extension official USG invitation. Nevertheless, should Badr choose make private visit to US, President would be pleased receive him. Accordingly, Ambassador requested call on Crown Prince and indicate that should Badr contemplate visiting US, President Kennedy would be most happy to receive him in Washington, D. C. Care should be taken Badr does not rpt not misconstrue this as official invitation.

HEA:HE/TWScaly:mhr 10/12/61

HEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances: G - Mr. Dexter

W/PR - Mr. Genger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to National Day
Message

On October 24 Mr. Bromley Smith sent us the attached telegram in Arabic of October 24 from the King of Yemen to the President. The telegram and translation thereof are enclosed. Since the King's telegram was sent in reply to the President's recent message of congratulations on the anniversary of the King's accession to the throne, it is recommended that no reply be made.

L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Telegram and
translation.

845

Sent to C.F.
(Yemen)

OK

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10/26

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DATE: 11/18/61

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
INFORMATION TELEGRAM**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 9

DATE: 1/21/62

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 298 (TAIZ)

PAGES: 5

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

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ITEM: 10

DATE: 4/28/62

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

EMBTEL 433 (TAIZ)

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State *Yemen*

35

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 24295

Rec'd: June 30, 1962

5:05 p.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 531, June 30, 9 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SP

AF

AIDA

ACTION DEPARTMENT 531, INFORMATION CAIRO 48, BEIRUT 14,
DAMASCUS 2, JIDDA 158, AMMAN 5

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RMR

DEPARTMENT POUCH BAGHDAD, BENGHAZI, RABAT, TUNIS, KUWAIT,
KHARTOUM

FILE

Foreign Minister Hasan Bin Ibrahim asked me call on him morning June 28 and requested my private views and advice re mission he undertaking on order Imam Ahmad to assess feasibility some initiative reduce tensions between UAR and other Arab States, and normalize Yemen-UAR relations.

Imam, Sayyed Hasan explained, dissatisfied with lack political maneuverability imposed on him by present situation where many Arab leaders at odds with UAR, each having his own unique personal dispute with Nasser. Atmosphere might be improved if all could be persuaded cease propaganda attacks, then hold meeting Arab League to tackle and solve some minor inter-Arab problem. This might provide favorable climate for solution major disputes one by one directly between Nasser and other Arab leaders. Nasser's denunciation of UAS, Sayyed Hasan continued, was unilateral and not recognized by Yemen, which still retains office of "Imam's deputy" in Cairo. However, Yemen's federation was with UAR composed of Egypt and Syria; while Egypt remains UAR name, this is invalid and UAR cannot be re-established in previous form unless some kind union first reinstated between Egypt and Syria. Alternatively, normal diplomatic relations might be set up with Egypt at some level. Question is one both of substance and timing. Sayyed Hasan

had

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SECRET

-2- 531, June 30, 9 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Taiz

had several times discussed with Imam anomalous situation relations with Egypt, but heretofore Imam had ordered hands off. Imam now believes time has come to see whether something constructive can be done.

Sayyed Hasan then asked me (1) for our current assessment Nasser's intentions and policies; (2) whether I thought effort to calm inter-Arab propaganda exchanges, particularly between Nasser and King Saud, might succeed; (3) what course I thought Yemen should take in presence circumstances.

Replying to point two, I said King Saud appears convinced Nasser is Communist, and we had tried without much success to disabuse him on this score. Meanwhile we under attack by Saudi press and radio for assisting UAR. I could not say whether effort create harmony between Saud and Nasser would succeed, but felt it would be difficult task requiring wise intermediary trusted by both sides. Sayyed Hasan said Saud's attitude (not that of Prince Faisal) would carry much weight with Imam.

On other points I requested time to think, and arranged meet Sayyed Hasan again in afternoon.

Having done homework I described to Sayyed Hasan recent evolution US relations with UAR, beginning with Bowles-Nasser conversation and culminating in Kaissouni visit in May. I explained we believed Nasser adopting increasingly reasonable attitudes on world problems, and our action encourage him focus on domestic affairs rather than seek adventures abroad. While, as Ambassador Bowles remarked, we expect no miracles, we hope our policy will in long run contribute to area stability. At same time we see no indication Nasser abandoning aspiration to leadership in Arab world or attachment to his brand of "Arab socialism".

(Sayyed

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-3- 531, June 30, 9 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Taiz

(Sayyed Hasan said in this case prospect success his mission is dim). I expressed personal opinion differences between Egypt and other Arab States should and must be resolved, but timing and how this is to be done can be decided only by Arabs themselves.

Re Yemen-UAR relations I said I considered Imam's policy of dignity and forbearance following break-up UAS wise, just as I considered him justified in stating publicly his anti-Socialist policy and its basis in Islam. So long as present equivocal situation lasts, GOY is vulnerable to Cairo Propaganda, which strikes responsive cord among youths who have studied in Egypt and army personnel trained by Egyptian officers. (Sayyed Hasan discounted effect Voice of Arabs in Yemen, saying its allegations so frequently demonstrated false it now "60 percent" discredited. Yemenis now prefer Radio Mecca. He added North Yemenis had such bitter memories of arrogance Egyptian training mission in Sanaa they would never accept Egyptian control). I then said his request for advise raised many questions which I could not answer with confidence. Among these were:

1. As UAS broke up over socialism issue, would Nasser demand concessions on this point before re-establishing confederation with Yemen?
2. Egypt can help Yemen, particularly in education. However, would Egypt limit her activities to assistance in agreed fields, or seek promote some interest of her own? (Hasan

STOOKEY

SW:DT

SECRET

Pouched by DCT

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

11

35

SECRET

Action
NEA

Control: 24282

Rec'd: June 30, 1962

5:50 p.m.

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 531, June 30, 9 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SP

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 531, INFORMATION CAIRO 48, BEIRUT 14,
DAMASCUS 2, JIDDA 158, AMMAN 5, DEPARTMENT POUCH BAGHDAD,
BENGHAZI, RABAT, TUNIS, KUWAIT, KHARTOUM'

commented all Egyptian teachers abroad are intelligence
agents.)

3. Yemen needs quiet period for reform and development efforts of
new Cabinet to bear fruit. If door re-opened to Egyptians, would
they have patience to allow Yemen work out problems in its own
way?

4. We would be disappointed at any complication of our aid
efforts in Yemen. Nasser's personal representative attempted
embroil my predecessor with high GOY officials. In new
US-UAR climate, would such efforts be resumed:

I concluded by saying problems intimately bound up with Arab
feelings and attitudes perhaps no non-Arab could offer really
valid counsel, but believed factors mentioned were per-
tinent.

Sayyed Hasan thanked me warmly for this discussion, which
he said would be useful in his final talks with Imam and
Crown Prince before his departure. He asked if he could bring
me anything from Cairo; I replied I wished him bring back
only palm of success in his mission.

Foreign Minister plans spend few days Addis Ababa beginning
July 3, then proceed Cairo. Depending on results his discussions

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-2- 531, June 30, 9 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Taiz

there he may visit Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Jidda.

Comment: Imam keeps self intimately informed on inter-Arab Affairs and is wily politician. They might just be chance his present demarche could lead to something constructive.

For Cairo: Sayyed Hasan will probably get in touch with Embassy. As he is Yemen's most seasoned diplomat, with long experience regional matters, discussion with him by Embassy officers should be interesting and useful.

STOOKEY

SGC

Pouched by DCT

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ITEM: 12

DATE: 6/30/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 532 (TAIZ)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

4442

JUL 10 5 10 PM '62

57

Origin
NEA
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy JIDDA 10
INFO: AmLeg TAIZ 3
AmEmbassy CAIRO 39

SS

CAIRO FOR USAIRA

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RMR

Deptel 410 to Taiz, rpt Jidda 483; Jidda tel 766; Taiz tel 515;
USAIRA Cairo's 33765, July 5, 1962

As stated DepTel 410 (not repeated Cairo) Dept considers possibility
providing Imam with helicopter remote. At this stage we wish do nothing arouse
Yemeni expectations re military training or ultimate supplying military equip-
ment. For this reason we cannot rpt not support suggestion AIRA CAIRO message
provide Imam helicopter and crew for 30 days or make gift later.

END

RISK

Drafted by: NEA:NE:AKillgore:lm:7/10/62	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
Clearances: NE - Mr. Strong US Air Force Field Activities Group - Col. Welsh (subs)	

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ITEM: 14

DATE: 8/8/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 37 (TAIZ)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: C

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

15

~~SECRET~~

Control: 6172

Rec'd: August 8, 1962

5:47 p.m.

43
Action

NEA

Info

FROM: Taiz

TO: Secretary of State

20

SS

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AID

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INR

NO: 38, August 7, 8 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 38, INFORMATION JIDDA 18.

Imam named Sayyed Abu Talib Minister Public Works August 6
replacing Prince Hasan Bin al-Tali who has returned Sanaa
"to assist Crown Prince."

RMR

Comment: Job had obviously become too difficult for Prince Hasan,
who doubtless well-meaning but inexperienced and without suffi-
cient back-bone stand firm against hostile propaganda and constant
stream disgruntled laborers, particularly those with extremist-
inspired grievances against AID/BPR.

Appointment Abu Talib definite indication Imam's confidence in
US. Abu Talib is perhaps only reliable friend US has in Yemen.
He has guts and can be expected do his utmost facilitate smooth
progress our activities. His effectiveness dependent upon
success his many enemies in undermining Imam's confidence in
him and thwarting his policies.

This change unfortunately accentuates cleavage GOY between
Sanaa and Taiz. Prince Hasan cannot feel happy as public
evidence his failure, and may influence Crown Prince to detri-
ment Abu Talib and, indirectly, US. Situation Taiz will be
delicate, as mission and AID/Y obliged deal intimately with
both Abu Talib and his bitter enemy Foreign Minister Hasan Bin
Ibrahim.

STOOKEY

UMT:HC

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16
Aug 9 5 42 PM '62

DB

Origin

To

Info:

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RMR

ACTION: Amlegation TAIZ 34
INFO: USUN NEW YORK 311

Your 40; Our 18

Amount of \$17,170 as outlined ref ourtel correct minimum payment Yemen must make to avoid loss of vote in GA under Article 19. Agree unwise raise any question on difference between above amount and proposed GOY contribution.

Presume contribution will be in dollars (or other convertible currency which SYG has agreed to accept in advance.) Since time important, essential you keep us informed progress of payment.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

TO: OIA: HJSilverman: WHZiehl: ecp 8/9/62

Classification approved by:

OIA = W. H. Ziehl

Clearances:

NEA = Mr. Ludlow (in draft)
NE = Mr. Kilgore (in draft)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

17

46

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 14184

020

Rec'd: August 18, 1962
5:33 p.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

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NO: 49, August 18, 10 a.m.

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ACTION JIDDA 28, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 49.

USIA

INR

JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR AND US ATTACHE

CIA

NSA

EMBTEL 16 re military training.

RMR

Legation comments: (1) Costs international travel (which GOY unable meet) apparently not covered in estimates reference telegram. If Legation's proposed Cultural Exchange Program for FY 1963 approved we may be able (reluctantly sacrificing other elements program) issue specialist grants for three officers in ASSOC INF OFF course, but not 31 participants in orientation tour, which otherwise excellent idea. Suggest alternative means financing international travel be explored.

(2) Would be useful for Legation know starting dates INF OFF course. USIS Yemen will not be in position conduct intensive English language instruction before February 1963.

(3) Training in Jordan would be less effective than CONUS in producing psychological results sought. Further consideration should take account arrival Yemen last week Jordan Army Training Mission which will operate in Sanaa.

STOOKEY

DMJ/14

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FILE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

59

~~SECRET~~Action
NEAControl: 23028
Rec'd: August 29, 1962
3:40 PM

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 52, August 27, 5 PM

PR

AIDA

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 52, INFORMATION JIDDA 29

RMR

On two occasions during past two years plans were well advanced for semi-official visit to US by Crown Prince Badr but circumstances intervened to prevent trip. Legation continues believe such visit would pay handsome dividends by reassuring both Imam and Badr concerning our attitude on succession issues; consolidating present strong US position in Imam's confidence during remainder his reign; and encouraging favorable disposition Badr toward US during crucial period following Imam Ahmad's demise, which will be of basic importance whether or not Badr succeeds in establishing self on throne.

Present period when Imam in relatively good health and intellectual vigor offers best possible opportunity revive plans. Assuming Afme and John Mecom will participate as previously agreed and President remains willing receive Badr, recommend earliest feasible date be tentatively established and legation be authorized seek Imam's agreement extension invitation to Badr.

Following might be considered in planning:

1. Attendance at UNGA

2. Visit Cape Canaveral, particularly if rocket launching can be witnessed.

3. Army might arrange visit Fort Benning, in view possible training Yemeni officers there.

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FILE

~~SECRET~~

-2- 52, August 27, 5 PM, From: Taiz

4. AID/Y Director Megellas could arrange with municipal authorities Fond du Lac Wisconsin for suitable visit representative small US city. (Fond du Lac is considering affiliation agreement with Taiz).

5. Fouad El-Khoury, formerly of AID/Y now in US knows Badr personally and would be effective escort officer.

6. As Badr keenly interested in agricultural development, visit to small-scale irrigation project in Southwest would be useful.

7. Visit would provide good opportunity agree perform engineering work for Sanaa municipal water system.

STOOKEY

CC

Message delayed in transmission.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

55

~~SECRET~~

110126

*Sept
Yemen*

SEP 1 5 56 PM '62

Origin ACTION: AmLegation TAIZ 53

NEA INFO : AmEmbassy JIDDA 76

SS Taiz's 52

G

SP

PR

AIDA

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IOP

INR

RMR

Impossible invite Crown Prince to US on official visit this year view previous commitments and crowded visitors schedule. Informal working visit possibly counter-productive since Badr likely compare unfavorably to red-carpet treatment received in SovBloc.

Last year during Badr's visit Rome we were prepared extend Badr official courtesies in Washington in course his projected unofficial US visit but he returned unexpectedly to Yemen. Should Badr again make plans visit US, possibly in connection with attendance at UNGA, we prepared reconsider.

Meanwhile we hope early extension invitation to senior Yemeni military officer to visit US military installations plus offer of training opportunities in US for Yemeni infantry officers will enhance US-Yemeni relations.

END.

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:NE:TWSee:ms 8-31-62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Strong

G - Mr. Hackler (subs)

S/S - Mr. Kreibel

White House = Mr. Kaysen

U/PR - Mr. King (subs)

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FORM 5-61 DS-322

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

WORK COPY 522¹⁹

~~SECRET~~

AmLegation TAIZ

INFO : AmEmbassy JEDDA

Tais's S2

Impossible invite Crown Prince to US on official visit this year view previous commitments and crowded visitors schedule. Informal working visit possibly counter-productive since Badr likely compare unfavorably to red-carpet treatment received in SovBloc.

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END.

REA:NR:JED:JED:JED: 9-31-62

REA - James F. Grant

RE - Mr. Strong
C - Mr. Hackler (subs)

U/PZ - Mr. King (subs)

~~SECRET~~

FORM DS-322
8-61

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

20

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

8639

NEA

Rec'd:

SEPTEMBER 12, 1962

9:40 AM

Info

FROM: TAIZ

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

INR

RMR

NO: 61, SEPTEMBER 10, 10 AM

FILE

ACTION JIDDA 36, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 61, DHAHRAN 1.

JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR.

JIDDA'S 24 (DEPARTMENT 134, DHAHRAN 119).

I INFORMED SAYYED HASAN BIN IBAHIM SEPTEMBER 9 YOU MAY
"HAVE YOUR OWN PLANE" BY TIME YOUR NEXT VISIT IN OCTOBER,
AND THUS BE NO LONGER DEPENDENT ON CAIRO ATTACHE AIRCRAFT.
I INQUIRED WHETHER THIS WOULD FACILITATE GOY AGREEMENT TO
DIRECT FLIGHTS TAIZ AND INTERVAL TRIPS, E.G. TO SANAA.

SAYYED HASAN AGREED EXPLORE MATTER WITH IMAM AND CROWN
PRINCE, BUT GAVE ME IMPRESSION HE BELIEVED FACT PLANE BASED
SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT OF ITSELF MATERIALLY ALTER THEIR
ATTITUDE.

AS MOST YUGOSLAV PILOTS EMPLOYED BY GOY HAVE NOW DEPARTED
AND YEMEN AIRLINES IN PROCESS EXCHANGING BRITISH ACECA FOR
SCANDINAVIANS, WE MAY BE ABLE MAKE PERSUASIVE CASE ON GROUNDS
GOY SIMPLY UNABLE PROVIDE YOU ADEQUATE TRANSPORT.

STOOKEY

GDW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~This document consists of 1 pages
number 12 of 45 copies, Series A.RECEIVED
N. S. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

SEP 14 3 18 PM '62

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

SEP 13 1962

FILE

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: Pro-Nasser Army Coup Plot in the Yemen

Army Plotters Plan Overthrow of Regime. A recent report states that a group of Yemeni Army officers is conspiring "perhaps shortly" to assassinate the Imam, arrest Crown Prince Badr, and establish a republic. The plotters are believed to have Nasser's support and to have gained the adherence of important tribal leaders.

Nasser Needs Success. In the wake of his continued failure to stage a comeback in Syria, Nasser probably feels the need for some concrete victory in the war he declared against the "reactionaries" following the breakup of the UAR and the UAS at the end of 1961. His intensified campaign to bring the Yemen back into the fold was heralded by the pro-Nasser student riot in San'a in July and by the Cairo radio's subsequent publicizing of unrest in the Yemen.

Turmoil Ahead in the Yemen. If this attempt fails, the Imam's repressive measures will become increasingly severe, but Nasser probably will try again. If it succeeds, the new regime may be unable for some time to extend its control over the entire country and a struggle for power may ensue among the enemies of the old regime. Both the Bloc and the British will encourage opposition to any pro-Nasser move.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Logged 14 SEP 1962

Copies:
Horne
Taylor

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

22

UNCLASSIFIED

36-H
Action

Control: 14846
Rec'd: September 19, 1962
1:30 p.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Jidda

SS
SR
G

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 184, September 19

SP
EUR
SSC
P

NIACT

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 184 INFORMATION TAIZ 29, CAIRO 39,
LONDON 17, ADEN 8, AMMAN 29, BEIRUT 85, DAMASCUS 17,
ROME 4.

Have confirmed with Yemeni Minister truth today's radio
Sanaa report of death Imam this morning in Taiz of
natural causes. Babr proclaimed King.

HART

AJT

FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

23

39

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

Control: 14857

Rec'd: September 19, 1962

1:44 P.M.

NEA

Info

FROM: Jidda

SSC

TO: Secretary of State

G

PR

P

US IA

INR

RMR

NO: 185, September 19, 6 P. M.

FILE

NIACT.

ACTION NIACT TAIZ 30, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 185.

If no objection seen please present to HM Imam Muhammad Al-Badr following message from me after making any changes you feel appropriate:

"Grieved to learn today September 19 of death of your illustrious father Imam Ahmad on whom be God's mercy and peace. His graciousness to me will remain as warm recollection of my first visits to Kingdom of Yemen.

"As you take up your heavy burdens amid sorrow of this moment please accept my warmest good wishes for your health, happiness and success and for blessings of progress and prosperity to noble people of Yemen under your wise guidance and God's care".

HART

mbk

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

37-H

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control
Rec'd:

15770
SEPTEMBER 20, 1962
1:14 PM

NEA

Info

FROM: TAIZ

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 74, SEPTEMBER 20

SP

AF

EUR

NIAC

IO

PR

P

USIA

INR

CIA

NSA

RMR

FILE

032

ACTION DEPARTMENT 74, JIDDA NIAC 44, LONDON NIAC 3, INFORMATION
ADEN PRIORITY 22, ASMARA UNNUMBERED, CAIRO PRIORITY 11, ADDIS
ABABA PRIORITY 7, BEIRUT PRIORITY 8.

DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN MINISTRY ISMAIL JIRAFT SUMMONED
CHIEFS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS TAIZ 5:00 PM SEPTEMBER 19 AND
DISTRIBUTED TWO NOTES. FIRST TRANSMITTED ANNOUNCEMENT DEMISE
IMAM AHMAD. SECOND STATED PEOPLE THROUGHOUT KINGDOM HAD SWORN
FEALTY TO FORMER CROWN PRINCE BADR AS SUCCESSOR TO THE CALIPHATE
AND HE NOW LAWFUL KING OF YEMEN WITH TITLE IMAM MUHAMMAD
AL-MANSUR BALLAH.

ON BEHALF FOREIGN MINISTER (NOW IN SANAA) JIRAFI ASSURED
DIPLOMATIC CORPS IMAM MUHAMMAD AND HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PROTECT
SECURITY AND RIGHTS FOREIGN COMMUNITIES IN YEMEN AND FAITHFULLY
DISCHARGE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. ADDED NEW GOVT
PREPARED ENTERTAIN ANY QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS FROM MISSIONS.

FOLLOWING FONOFF MEETING DIPLOMATIC CORPS ASSEMBLED AT ETHIOPIAN
LEGATION AND DRAFTED TELEGRAM TO FONMIN REQUESTING HIM EXPRESS
CORPS CONDOLENCES TO ROYAL FAMILY, GOY AND PEOPLE OF YEMEN.
QUESTION CONGRATULATIONS TO NEW IMAM LEFT TO DISCRETION RESPECTIVE
HEADS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

HEADS WESTERN MISSIONS (UK, ITALY, FRG, AND US) THEN CONFERRED
AND AGREED BEST POLICY IS RECOMMEND TO RESPECTIVE GOVTS TRANSMITTAL
PROMPT MESSAGE CONGRATULATION TO IMAM MUHAMMAD, AND PROCEED ON
PRINCIPLE HE HAS SUCCEEDED AS LEGITIMATE SOVEREIGN.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 74, SEPTEMBER 20, FROM TAIZ

RADIO SANAA AFTERNOON 19TH REPORTED NEW IMAM HAD SENT TELEGRAMS TO "ALL FRIENDLY COUNTRIES", ARAB LEAGUE AND UNITED NATIONS ANNOUNCING HIS FATHER'S DEATH AND HIS OWN SUCCESSION. IF SUCH MESSAGE ACTUALLY RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON, RECOMMEND REPLY BE SENT TO IMAM MUHAMMAD CONGRATULATING HIM ON HIS SUCCESSION EITHER DIRECT TO HIM IN SANAA OR THROUGH LEGATION. (CHARGE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE NIACT AUTHORIZATION EXTEND PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS.) IF NOT SUCH MESSAGE RECEIVED RECOMMEND LEGATION BE INSTRUCTED CONGRATULATE IMAM ON BEHALF PRESIDENT AND USG.

FOR LONDON: UK MINISTER IN ADEN AND DATE HIS RETURN DEPENDS UPON VAGARIES YAL FLIGHTS. IN GANDY'S ABSENCE SECOND UNDERSECRETARY ASH MAKING FACTUAL REPORT; UK LEGATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS TO AWAIT GANDY'S RETURN TAIZ. MEANWHILE ASH BELIEVES WOULD BE HELPFUL IF EMBASSY APPRISED APPROPRIATE FONOFF OFFICIALS ENFORMALLY OF FOREGOING.

STOOKEY

JTC

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10582

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

57

Origin

NEA

Info:

SS

SR

G

PR

P

USIA

RMR

ACTION: AmLegation TAIZ 79 NIACT
INFO: AmEmbassy JIDDA 103

FILE

SEP 20 5 15 PM '62

HM Imam Muhammad al-

Following is Presidential message for Chargé deliver to ~~Successor~~ ~~Embassy~~ Badr:

" I am saddened by the untimely death of your illustrious father, His Majesty Imam Ahmed, with whom we have enjoyed excellent relations. While I deeply regret the tragic loss to Yemen of her esteemed Monarch I congratulate you on the occasion of your succession to the throne. I wish to assure you of my ~~highly~~ ~~desire~~ ~~to~~ ~~maintain~~ ~~the~~ ~~excellent~~ ~~relations~~ ~~which~~ ~~have~~ ~~so~~ happily existed between the United States and Yemen under your predecessor. I look forward with pleasure to a warm association with your Government and your people under your wise guidance and God's care.

John F. Kennedy"

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Telegraphic transmission and
NEA:NE:TWSeelye:lm:9/19/62	classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
Clearances:	
NE - Mr. Strong	S/S - Mr. Little
White House - Mr. Smith	U/PR - Mr. Bowers

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~~SECRET~~

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N. S. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

SEP 21 9 46 AM '62

SEP 20 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: WEAKER HAND AT HELM IN YEMEN

FILE

New Imam of Yemen Lacks Strong Internal Following. The new Imam of Yemen, Muhammad al-Badr, son of the deceased Imam Ahmad, is not popular in Yemen. His "modernist" tendencies may appeal to certain reformist and the numerically large, but politically dispossessed elements of the south. But these tendencies make him unacceptable in the long run to the politically dominant, conservative Shia aristocracy and northern tribal groups. Although a minority in the country, these groups, if sufficiently organized and motivated hold the power to resist the new Imam. Lacking a powerful internal following, Badr probably will continue to look to outside forces, including the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the UAR, for support. King Saud, who is likely to seek a political role in the Yemen, is known to oppose Badr.

Instability Ahead in the Yemen. It is doubtful that Badr has his father's ability to manipulate successfully the diverse and conflicting elements in the Yemen. The contest among sectarian groups and between the pro-Bloc and the pro-Nasser reformist elements is likely to sharpen, as is the friction between the reformists and the conservatives. If Badr cannot win over the Shia elements, they may give their support to his more conservative uncle Prince Hasan, thus precipitating a dynastic struggle for power. Hasan, Yemen's representative at the UN, reportedly is considering leaving for Ethiopia or Saudi Arabia to organize opposition to Badr.

~~SECRET~~

Logged 21 SEP 1962

5534
262

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

OK
1. Komer for
Chambers
2. Return BCS

September 19, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: ^{CS} William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

May we have White House clearance
on the enclosed proposed cable to Taiz
at your earliest convenience?

Too fruity, in light of
possibility we may back
Hassan instead of Badr,
but otherwise I guess we
have no choice.

PWK

File
OK as revised
S/S informed BCS

SEP 20 1962

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

WORK COPY

5534
266

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AmLegation TAIZ
INFO: Ambassy JIDDA

NIACT

HM Imam Muhammad al-
Following is Presidential message for Charge deliver to ~~AmLegation~~ Badr:

" I am saddened by the untimely death of your illustrious father, His Majesty Imam Ahmed, with whom we have enjoyed excellent relations. While I deeply regret the tragic loss to Yemen of her esteemed Monarch I congratulate you on the occasion of your succession to the throne. I wish to assure you of my ~~high esteem and my~~ desire to maintain the excellent relations which have so happily existed between the United States and Yemen under your predecessor. I look forward with pleasure to a warm association with your Government and your people under your wise guidance and God's care.

John F. Kennedy"

END

NEA:NE:TW:Tel:mr:9/19/62

NE - Mr. Strong
White House -

S/S -

NEA - Phillips Talbot

U/P - Mr. Dowe

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8-61 DS-322
SEP 20 1962

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

39
Action
NEA

Control: 16659
Rec'd: September 21, 1962
9:18 am

Info

FROM: Aden

EUR
E
P

TO: Secretary of State

USIA
INR

NO: 24, September 21, 2 pm

CIA
NSA
OSD

ACTION DEPARTMENT 24, INFORMATION JIDDA 5, LONDON 5, TAIZ
UNNUMBERED

ARMY
NAVY

AIR
OPR

DC
DCT

CAB
COM

FAA
RMR

Consul John D. Tinny returned from Taiz today via Asmara. He reports atmosphere Taiz somewhat unsettled but situation basically calm as of noon September 20 when he departed. With Badr accession apparently accepted by most elements population at least for present. Assume Department received number of Taiz telegram which he carried to Asmara for transmission. Manager Aden Telegraph Company reports some messages now being received from Taiz but as of 1 p.m. Aden time September 21 Consulate has received nothing from Taiz for transmission or otherwise. Manager has promised expedite incoming and outgoing traffic for Consulate. Yemen Airlines Taiz/Aden air service still suspended apparently due technical difficulties and general confusion rather than any specific orders Yemen Government with some hope resumption September 22.

WHEELLOCK

GOW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ITEM: 28

DATE: 9/21/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 1199 (LONDON)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

7
ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

29
5577
9/22
J. R. Kame
SEP 21 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

FILE

Subject: Implications of the Death of Imam Ahmed,
King of Yemen

There is enclosed a paper discussing the implications of
the death of Imam Ahmed, King of Yemen, which may prove of
interest to the President.

/s/ E. S. Little

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Paper concerning Imam Ahmed,
King of Yemen.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEATH OF IMAM AHMED BIN YAHYA

1. Implications. We have long feared that the death of Imam Ahmed might prove to be the spark setting off severe internal disturbances in Yemen. The Imam had controlled successfully an explosive situation: the low level of economic activity, frustrated pretensions to the Aden Colony and protectorates, the impecunious state of the treasury, the Islamic sectarian schism, reformist discontent, and tribal restiveness are built-in factors which have long threatened internal stability. The UAR, the USSR and the UK have fished in these troubled waters. The Imam barely managed to keep the lid on by force of personality, a ruthless policy of divide and rule, clever manipulation of various factions in the country, and a repressive police and legal system.

Crown Prince Badr has neither exhibited the stature of the Imam, nor commanded much of an internal following nor displayed qualities of leadership. Those who know him claim he is weak, and fearful of internal opposition. Nevertheless, in recent months Badr has toured Yemen in an apparent effort to win some semblance of popular support. He once was thought to be beholden to the Soviets and their potential tool. However, in the last year-and-a-half Badr has made a determined effort to be impartial in his relations with Eastern bloc and Western representatives. He has conveyed word to U.S. Government representatives that he would like to lean more in the direction of the West, but needed tangible evidence of our friendship before doing so.

2. The Succession Question. Badr has evidently assumed power in accordance with his "acknowledged" position as Crown Prince. However, this appears to run counter to the basic Zaydi position that the Imamate is not hereditary; that the Imam cannot be designated prior to his predecessor's death; and that a new Imam must be chosen by the Ulama (religious elders) on the basis of 13 legally specified criteria and must receive the homage of the prominent tribal and other leaders. It may be that the Ulama have so designated Badr, but, if not, this may invite some resentment in conservative Zaydi circles.

How long the Crown Prince can hold on is a moot question. The key to Badr's success is the support of the dominant conservative Zaydis, an offshoot of the Shi'a sect of Islam that has long held preponderant influence, and the tribes, who are unreliable and opportunistic. If Badr cannot win over the Zaydis, they may give their support to his more conservative uncle, Prince Hasan. Hasan, who has served as head of the Yemen UN delegation, is reportedly considering leaving the U.S. to organize the opposition to Badr. A dynastic struggle for power could well ensue. Badr must also reckon with the Shafi'i community located in the south and southwest. The latter are anti-Zaydi and comprise 60 percent of Yemen's population.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
-2-

The loyalty to the Imam of the military and security forces who surround the Imam will be put to test over the coming weeks. For his immediate protection the new Imam must rely on his royal bodyguard of between 500 and 600 men (the al-Mifla), the 5,000-strong tribal irregulars (the Barzani), a special battalion of troops called the "Badr Battalion," a regular army of some 9,000 men and a reserve force of some 3,000. The loyalty of none of these groups is assured.

So far reports indicate that he has summoned cabinet ministers and princes to the Palace to seek their undivided support. After accepting the resignation of Army commanders, judges and other high officials, he has reportedly reinstated them. He has also given an address over Sanaa radio promising inter alia to "issue regulations" assuring the rights and privileges of all citizens. The latter is no doubt an effort to appeal to reformists, and is in character with Badr's earlier efforts to persuade the Imam to undertake reform in Yemen.

3. Hadi Hala. In the past, the late Imam's brother and Chief Yemen delegate to the UN, Prince Hasan bin Yahya, has sought U.S. Government support in his aspirations to succeed Imam Ahmed. We will no doubt now come under pressure to provide such support which, for the time being, we must resist. We do not believe that we should involve ourselves in a Yemeni power struggle unless Yemen should veer too far in the direction of the Soviet Union.

There are two basic reasons why we should not support Hasan: in the first place, we question the advisability of placing our support behind a member of the Hailing (Muaid al-Din) Family, which is so discredited in Yemen and which, being out of step with modern times, may not last for long. Prince Hasan enjoys the support of some elements in the Royal Family, as well as certain tribes, but we are unaware that he has any significant support from the more enlightened elements. (On the other hand, Badr's announced reformist intentions may enlist the following of at least some of the reformists.) Prince Hasan is over 50, was once a religious zealot, and is not possessed of a particularly strong or magnetic personality. The only thing that commands him is that he is pro-American and anti-Communist. There is the outside possibility that by becoming known to be actively associated with Hasan -- these things cannot be kept secret in the Arab World -- we shall alienate the very elements who are likely to assume power in Yemen sooner or later.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
-3-

Secondly, there is some question as to whether our "limited support" of Prince Hasan would have the desirable effect, i.e. put him in power, let alone keep him there. There are several cliques competing for power in Yemen and in the conflict which may ensue, any one or combination of cliques has a chance to take over, but probably not for long. Even if we helped Hasan into power, we could probably not keep him there short of full-scale support. Military allegiances in Yemen are reportedly more with elements which might support Crown Prince Badr (i.e. the UAR or the Soviets). For example, the Soviet bloc has been reported to exercise considerable influence in the air force and among the paratroops. Thus it is probable that Prince Hasan could not long retain power once gained and that the USG would once again be "exposed" (by whoever took over from Hasan) as having connived in the power politics of another country.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

47
Action~~SECRET~~Control: 19820
Rec'd: September 25, 1962
4:51 p.m. 019SCA
Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

NO: 85, September 24, 10 a.m.

G

SP

NEA

ACTION DEPARTMENT 85, INFORMATION BEIRUT 10.

AIDA

P

BEIRUT FOR MELG

IOP

INR

RMR

Department telegram 80

Legation regrets any misunderstanding which may have arisen from use expression "phase" instead of "condition" Legation telegram 72. Precautions taken amply justified by initial jittery atmosphere Taiz, which still disturbed by rumors impending violence against close associates late Imam. Although GOY offices closed for one week mourning Legation and AID/Y adopting policy business and work as usual while taking opportunity refine emergency plans and ensure key personnel know their duties. Within few days, when confident we can handle any future disturbance as well as available facilities permit, we intend terminate alert condition. Meanwhile dependents outside Yemen on 19th returning and TDY personnel entering normally.

New Iman has thus far moved astutely. Promises rapid improvement living standard, end police and army oppression of citizens, and social justice for all have been well received. Substantial increase army salaries announced September 21 has had good effect on loyalty local army units.

Notwithstanding these reassuring factors we need further evidence before concluding Imam Muhammad can consolidate succession unchallenged. He has powerful enemies. Last reign leaves legacy old scores settlement of which may threaten public tranquillity.

Execution

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FILE

~~SECRET~~

-2- 85, September 24, 10 a.m., from Taiz

Execution of reforms promised handicapped by general ignorance and poverty, and will run counter to interests numerous influential figures with stake in status quo. Imam must nevertheless move vigorously this direction in order forestall popular disillusion and resentment. In these basically unstable circumstances we shall endeavor operate normally while remaining alert to developments which might jeopardize security US community.

STOOKEY

SMD: CJ/2

~~SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF ATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

52 //
31

September 24, 1962

TO: Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

FROM: *EL* Edward Little
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attached is a memorandum reporting the results of a check as to the time in transit of the Taiz CRTTIC telegram of last week. I had actually said that I was the inquirer rather than you.

Command McCabe to note
And return: Official Use Only

September 21, 1962

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM TO: S/S - Mr. Little
FROM: S/S-O - Mr. Spear
SUBJECT: Delay in Taiz CRITIC Message

With regard to Mr. Smith's inquiry about delay in the receipt of Taiz CRITIC telegram No. 72 (a copy of which is attached) the sending date-time group is obviously an error, since it would be impossible to report the death of the Imam on September 19 in a cable filed September 18. Presumably this should have read September 19, 1000 a.m.

Mr. Newton in DC/T advises me that this telegram came via commercial cable facilities which have to be relayed via Aden or Cairo. The cable company's date-time indicator shows that it was filed at 3:00 p.m. Taiz time on September 19. Taiz is nine hours ahead of Washington so that this would have been filed at midnight September 19 Washington time. The date-time receipt block on the cable shows it was received at 0834, September 20 or about eight hours later. Mr. Newton says that routine cables regularly take one to two days from Taiz to the Department.

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

7
INCOMING TELEGRAM

316
Department of State

36-H

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 15529

Rec'd: September 20, 1962
8:34 a.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Taiz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

G

NO: 72, September 18, 10 a.m.

SP

AID

P

USIA

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INR

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A

RMR

CRITIC

ACTION DEPARTMENT 72 INFORMATION JIDDA 43.

Imam Ahmad died 12:55 a.m. Taiz time September 19 pulmonary embolus. Underlying cause of death influenza from which Imam had been suffering since September 12. Doctor Foster had been in attendance throughout preceding day, and was joined by Imam's other physicians at 4:30 p.m. All doctors signed joint report of death.

Prince Ismail, Minister State Abdullah Abd Al-Karim and Minister Palace Affairs Abd Al-Malik Al-Amri were with Imam at time death. GOY aircraft despatched Sana'a morning 19th bring Crown Prince Badr Taiz.

Charge has invoked Phase Three (alert and precaution phase) draft E and E Plan.

STOOKEY

AJT

Note: Passed USIB Agencies 9/20/62, 8:45 a.m. JGG

NOTE: Mr. Talbot (NEA) SS, INR, USIA informed 9/20/62 - FMH.

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ITEM: 32

DATE: 9/25/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
INFORMATION TELEGRAM**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State *Yemen Kayser*

39-W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action
NEAControl: 21399
Rec'd: September 27, 1962
10:51 a.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

SS
SR
G

TO: Secretary of State

S P
L
H

NO: 510, September 27, 3 p.m.

FILE

AF
EUR
IO

PRIORITY

IGA
AID
P

ACTION DEPARTMENT 510, INFORMATION JIDDA 60, LONDON 33.

USIA
SCANSC
INRCIA
NSAOSD
ARMYNAVY
AIR

RMR

In call today on Anwar Sadat, former head of Arab Union and Presidential watch-dog on political organization, Sadat inquired re my estimate Yemen situation. After responding with general information and non-committal answer, Sadat retorted that REUTERS reported this morning successful Yemeni coup d'etat establishing republic and murder of Iman Mohammed. He then offered "word of advice" re USG attitude to coup, stating that it is generally believed in Yemen and among coup leaders that USG has been supporting Prince Hassan. Sadat considered this would be a grave mistake since "90 percent of country's intelligentsia support coup and republic". He was specifically concerned lest Saud, feeling own position imperilled, should press USG into support royal system and Hassan. This particularly possible since US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia was also accredited Yemen. Sadat stated that a number of potential leaders of new Yemeni regime were in Cairo and he had urged them to call upon me and state their views and plans.

In response I recapitulated USG position non-interference Arab internal affairs unless vital US interests threatened, illustrating this from US assistance to such divergent states as Iran, Jordan, UAR. Also assured Sadat I had no evidence US support for Hassan or any other Yemeni faction.

Sadat then assured me that new Yemeni regime raised no fears of communism and that would be friendly toward west, expressing

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

hope that
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 510, September 27, 3 p.m., from Cairo.

hope that western assistance in badly needed development of country would be forthcoming.

Comment: AP has now confirmed REUTERS report. Fair to assume from tenor Sadat's remarks that UAR in close contact with, if not responsible for, coup leaders. His pointed reference to Saud and fear of US yielding to Saud pressure raises question whether similar coup possibility in Saudi Arabia envisaged by UAR. Sadat specifically requested his views re Yemen be relayed to State Department.

BADEAU

REE

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**THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTED ITEM HAS
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ITEM: 34

DATE: 9/27/62

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 206 (JIDDA)

PAGES: 2

CLASS: C

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 35

DATE: 9/27/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 1288 (LONDON)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

**LOCATION:
 NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
 COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62**

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 36

DATE: 9/27/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
AIRGRAM A-132 (JIDDA)**

PAGES: 1

CLASS: C

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 37

DATE: 9/27/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
INFORMATION TELEGRAM**

PAGES: 1

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 38

DATE: 9/27/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
INFORMATION TELEGRAM**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

**LOCATION:
NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62**

BOX #: 207

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

39

Smith

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

TO : The Acting Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

Roy Hilsman

SEP 27 1962

FILE

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: TURMOIL IN PROSPECT IN THE YEMEN

Yemen Army Takeover Presages Instability. The Yemen Army "High Command" has toppled the new Imam, abolished the monarchy, and proclaimed the "Yemeni Arab Republic." UAR involvement in the coup is suspected.

New Regime Wants Reform. The new regime is expected to pursue a reform policy. While this will find widespread sympathy among the populace, it will also harden the determination of conservatives to oppose the destruction of those institutions that have insured their dominance. The tribes, wherever they initially stand, are likely in the long run to join such opposition. Thus, the coup could be the beginning of a period of internal conflict.

External Influences Will Complicate Events. Internal issues will be complicated by outside forces seeking to influence events. The UAR strongly supports the new regime. If the UAR is clearly seen to be directing affairs in the Yemen, conservative internal resistance to the new regime will increase. The UK, Saudi Arabia, and the Bloc will be disposed to oppose UAR control over the Yemen.

RECEIVED
N.S.C.
SEP 28 10 57 AM '62

*cc Hilsman
Taylor*

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

M
Origin

SS
Info

ACTION:

TOSEC
USUN/ 43

NIACT

PASS TALBOT FROM GRANT

SLP 27

SEP 27 1962

INFO: AmEmbassy CAIRO NIACT 323
" JIDDA NIACT 113
" LONDON NIACT 1782

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

~~USUN For Secretary of State Talbot from Grant.~~

FILE

083

Repeating separately Cairo Embtel 510 containing "word of advice" from UAR that USG avoid supporting Prince Hassan or acceding to Saudi advice to intervene in Yemen. Dept uncertain degree UAR influence on new regime or whether regime has and can maintain effective control, but we should reply in following vein at Ali Sabri level or higher:

Begin proposed message to Cairo:

USG does not repeat not plan interfere Yemeni affairs on behalf Prince Hassan or anyother Yemeni faction. US recognition of a new Yemeni government must await further information permitting assessment of popular acquiescence in and effectiveness of government's control and evidence of government's willingness and ability to respect international obligations.

Nature of relationship between new Yemeni government and UAR is not repeat not a matter for US concern. We wish UAR understand, however, USG has vital interest in maintenance security in Persian Gulf area, which dependent continuation UK position in Aden area. USG could not repeat not accept campaign mounted from Yemen against this position. In fact UK position in

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:JRB:arrow:em:9/27/62

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Killgore

NE - Mr. Strong

L/NEA - Mr. Hewitt

C/S - Mr. Breisky

EUR-Mr. Hollway

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~~SECRET~~

FORM
DS-322

~~SECRET~~

Aden and Persian Gulf directly promotes UAR interest in security of Kuwait. US thus looks to UAR to exert influence with new Yemeni regime to insure that efforts directed at internal stability and development rather than at external adventures. End proposed message.

We believe foregoing more profitable line of action than attempt manipulate Yemeni internal situation which possibly would fail or at least would entail being drawn too deeply into unpredictable Yemeni affairs. In our view, heart of problem is not in Sana'a but in Cairo and we are only Western power possessing possible capability of influencing situation there. Foregoing approach, while tending to shore up flank of UK position, would leave UK free to deal with Yemeni situation as deems best suited its interests. Suggest consultation with Lord Home.

Request comments London, Cairo, Jidda.

END

~~XXXXXX~~

BALL

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

54-51

CIRCULAR

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ACTION:

Amembassy JIDDA
LONDON
Amconsul ASMARA
Amembassy CAIRO
Amleg TAIZ
Amconsul ADEN
USUN

TOSEC

44

FILE

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NEA

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Following is roundup on Yemen developments:

Department has received no repeat no communication from Taiz since wireless report received of overthrow of Monarchy and establishment Republic.

Reports now clearly indicate revolutionaries working with UAR. At our suggestion UAR Ambassador Kamel has telegraphed his Government to lend any influence it may have in Yemen to ensure protection American citizens Yemen. Kamel said UAR officials may call at Legation Taiz. Destroyer USS PERRY due trying Aden from Bahrain September 30. ~~RECEIVED~~ Pentagon ~~try~~ through KAGNEW pick up any transmissions from Taiz.

YEMEN: Charge Zabarah speaking for Prince Hassan by telephone from New York requested USG declare against outside intervention Yemen and extend recognition to Hassan as new ruler of Yemen. Latter obviously not possible now. Hassan apparently planning return to area to contest for control. We shall continue in close consultation with British Embassy here on future developments and wish to concert our position with UK. FYI Hassan has seen Ambassador Stevenson and expected see Assistant Secretary Talbot who will convey position USG. Hassan also seeing Lord Home. END FYI

BAIL

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA-NE:AIKillgore:RCStrong:av 9/27/62

classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Strong

S/S - Mr. Breisky

BNA - Bergeson

~~SECRET~~

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FORM
8-61 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

FOR LONDON: Request closest consultations with Foreign Office be maintained
Separate telegram transmitting tentative US position on overall Yemen problem for
comment.

END

BAUL

~~SECRET~~

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ITEM: 42

DATE: 9/28/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 30 (ADEN)**

PAGES: 1

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

43

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yemen

~~SECRET~~

W
Action

Control: 22402
Rec'd: September 28, 1962
10:49 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Jidda

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 209, September 28, 1 p.m.

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 209 INFORMATION CAIRO NIACT 48 LONDON
NIACT 24 ADEN NIACT 14 USUN NIACT 15 TAIZ UNNUMBERED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPTEL USUN TOSEC 43 repeated Jidda 113.

Believe SAG would welcome cautionary word by USG to UARG
re Yemen. Proposed message would, however, provide little
reassurance to SAG since it would be viewed as giving Nasir
free hand in Yemen limited only at point where Britain
interests become involved.

Department might wish consider omission first and last
sentences second paragraph proposed message and sub-
stitution instead sentence indicating US and UAR and free
world have common interest in assuring stability in Yemen
particularly in view preponderant Soviet bloc presence. In
view this US hopes stay in close touch UAR Government re
Yemeni developments. We welcome UAR Government frankness re
Yemen and in turn plan be equally frank in expressing US
viewpoint.

Should UAR officials allude presence Ambassador Hart in Aden,
Embassy Cairo might point out logical US concern with safety
welfare 150 Americans in Yemen and lack any communication from
Legation Taiz.

-Comment-

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 209, September 28, 1 p.m. from Jidda

Comment: Suggest we refrain from language tending give endorsement to idea that whatever UAR does in Arab world is purely its affair or that we envisage important UAR role in Yemen. May not "word of advice" offered by UAR now open door for occasional discussion with UAR its policies vis-a-vis other Arab Governments.

THACHER

DMB

~~SECRET~~

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ITEM: 44

DATE: 9/28/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 1312 (LONDON)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

**LOCATION:
 NATIONAL SECURITY FILES
 COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62**

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

45

42

Action

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Control: 22950

Rec'd: September 28, 1962
6:57 p.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: London

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1318, September 28, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1318, INFORMATION JIDDA 26, ADEN 16, TAIZ
UNNUMBERED.

Foreign Office has message from British Minister Taiz, sent via Aden, that he and all diplomatic colleagues safe. Situation quiet, but all telegraphic communications out of Taiz cut. Dean Taiz Diplomatic Corps making representations to Taiz authorities reopen telegraphic lines to permit governments be notified all are well. Foregoing sent on off-chance Stookey may have been unable get message out of Taiz.

JONES

RAS/4

FILE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

46

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~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 22739

~~SS~~ *EA*

Rec'd: September 28, 1962

Info

3:23 p.m.

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1322 September 28, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT NIACT 1322 INFORMATION USUN NIACT 87
JIDDA NIACT 27 ADEN PRIORITY 17

USUN TOSEC

Embassy Telegram 1312

FONOFF tells me that during Walmsley's call at Yemen Legation this afternoon Prince Hassan finally agreed, after long argument, go to Saudi Arabia rather than Aden. Hopes leave this evening, but departure might be delayed until tomorrow. Since press inquiring, Foreign Office will say Walmsley has seen Hassan here but HMG has taken no position re current Yemeni situation.

JONES

EBC

NOTE: Advance copy SS 655 PM 9/28/CWO-L

Handled as LD-SS per S/S-0.

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

54
Action
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UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 22785
Rec'd: September 28, 1962
4:12 p.m.

FILE

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1332, September 28

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1332; INFORMATION JIDDA 28, ADEN 18, TAIZ
UNNUMBERED.

Yemen legation London today issued following statement
(unessential words omitted).

"Revolution in Yemen does not represent people and they
will not give their support to it. Prince Saif Al-Islam
Al Hassan, eldest brother of late Imam Ahmed, is now
legal Imam and he is on his way to Yemen to insure
security and peace. People of Yemen accept Prince
Hassan as new Imam."

JONES.

MRJ

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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8-23

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Origin

NEA

Info:

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ACTION: Amembassy JIDDA NIACT 116
INFO: TOSEC USUN 55
Amembassy LONDON 1809
AMMAN 136
BAGHDAD 89
BEIRUT 299
CAIRO 331

UK Embassy informed Department substance of telegram just received
in Taiz with
from UK Charge Taiz. All is quiet/ Army in control. Frontiers closed.
in Taiz.
All foreigners safe/ Diplomatic corps met FonMin and requested facilities
transmit messages. Allowed to do so in clear text and subject censorship.
New regime has ordered all foreigners be protected.

END

RAU

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:RCStrong:av 9/28/62

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

James P. Grant
NEA - ~~PHOTOGRAPHIC~~

EUR - JRHolway

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ITEM: 49

DATE: 9/30/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 181 (AMMAN)**

PAGES: 2

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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39-W

Action

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Control: 23402

Rec'd: September 29, 1962
11:18 a.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Aden

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 32, September 29, 1 p.m.

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NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 32 JIDDA UNNUMBERED

DEPARTMENT PASS INFORMATION AFCIN-DOD UNNUMBERED

FROM AMBASSADOR HART

Head of Aden Secretariat Oates informed me this morning message from Gandy at Taiz indicated Dean of Taiz Diplomatic Corps had obtained assurance local revolutionary authority "interests of foreign diplomatic community would be respected". No other news. Situation Yemen presumed quiet.

His assistant pointed out new Yemeni Foreign Minister Muhsin Al-Ayni formerly teacher at Shaikh Bayhani school Aden. Expelled from Colony 1960 for agitation.

Saw new Yemeni flag here this morning mounted on cargo truck: Broad lateral red stripes (top and bottom) each containing two marginal white stars; middle strip green with one central white star. Familiar words missing.

Enthusiasm of Yemeni community Aden for Republic is palpable.

WHEELLOCK

DMB

Note: Relayed to AFCIN, Air Force, Army, Navy, OSD, DOD, CIA, 9/29/62 : Advance copy Mr. Killgore (NEA) 1:45 p.m., CWO-JSW

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OCT 1 1962

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

51
make desk file
yemen

W

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 23379

SS

Rec'd: September 29, 1962

10:52 a.m.

Info

FROM: Aden

W/H

TO: Secretary of State

3

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NO: 33, September 29, 1 p.m.

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NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT 33 INFORMATION CAIRO PRIORITY 6, JIDDA 12,
LONDON PRIORITY 12.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

FROM AMBASSADOR HART

Reference: DEPTel 43 TOSEC; Cairo telegram 510 to Department.

Fully concur in comments contained Jidda EMBTEL 209 to
Department. Nervousness Sadat re US attitude could well
be based on considerable opportunities from north for
counter-revolutionary tribal activity led by Al-Hassan
and supplied by King Saud. Latter will not be amenable
to any proposals by USG that he avoid such activity. By
same token he might listen to advice Faysal or King
Hussein that provisioning of tribal resistance could go
on for years and be very expensive. It likely also to
be unacceptable to Saudi Army officers and to harmony
ofv*-Saudi Army unification effort. I shall discuss
situation with Sazaf informally but as persuasively as
possible following my return to Jidda tomorrow.

WHEELLOCK

AJT

* As received. Will be serviced upon request.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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L

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy CAIRO NIACT 335
INFO: Amembassy JIDDA 118
Amembassy LONDON 1830
USUN NEW YORK TOSEC 72

52
1-
Sep 29 7 50 PM '62
16428

FILE

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You are authorized

~~For delivery to Secretary and Lord Home~~ deliver message contained

DEPTTEL 323 at Ali Sabri level or higher. First sentence second paragraph should be introduced with phrase "so long as it is based on respect for Yemen's sovereignty."

~~END~~

EX FYI. Secretary discussed Yemen situation with Lord Home and during course conversation indicated we considering sending message, without showing him text. In response to Secretary's query, Home indicated such a message would be useful.

END

BALL

Drafted by: NEA:NE:JBarrow:bmh	9/29/62	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
Clearances: S/S - Mr. Johnson S - Mr. Swank (substance)		

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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16425

SEP 29 7 17 PM '62

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Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION:
Amembassy JIDDA 117
Amleg TAIZ 94
Amconsul ADEN 32
INFO:Amembassy LONDON 1829
CAIRO 334
TOSEC USUN 71

FILE

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

Assistant Secretary Talbot met with Prince Hassan afternoon September 27. Hassan asked for money and radio transmitter. Talbot responded this virtually impossible but left door open to future contact. Hassan disappointed but remained friendly. He departed for London that evening and is expected shortly proceed Aden via Jidda.

Previously Hassan had seen Lord Home. British have informed us Hassan made series of requests including safe conduct to Beihan, money, arms, transmitter, armed escort to Yemeni frontier, general support. Home said would have to consider requests but saw no reason ^{why} ~~he~~ he should not go Beihan. Suggested Hassan wait New York for answers but Hassan said would get them in London and would then go Jidda seek Saudi help. UK at present inclined go no further than help Hassan reach Yemen but keeping minds open.

We agreed with UK to concert on question of recognition and exchange information.

FYI Posts should avoid being drawn into contacts with Hassan. We do not wish become involved. Tentative position US thinking of taking with

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:RCStrong:av 9/28/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Holloway
- Mr. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

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FORM
5-61 DS-322

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy JIDDA, etc.

~~SECRET~~
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UAR explained to UK with request for comment and suggestions (see DEPTTEL
USUN TOSEC 43, CAIRO 323, JIDDA 113, LONDON 1782.)

END

BAUL

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ITEM: 54

DATE: 9/30/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 182 (AMMAN)**

PAGES: 1

CLASS: C

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207

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ITEM: 55

DATE: 9/30/62

**DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
 EMBTel 73 (DHAHRAN)**

PAGES: 1

CLASS: C

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

COUNTRIES: YEMEN, GENERAL, 8/61-9/62

BOX #: 207